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Abstract
There is a long ongoing debate on whether interaction in a market
influences moral decisions of individuals. While some studies show
that individuals tend to decide less morally when being exposed to a
market environment, other studies argue that the experience of mar-
ket interaction promotes moral behavior. We add to this discussion
by distinguishing between two moral concepts: consequentialism and
deontology. According to consequentialism, actions are evaluated only
by their consequences. Contrary to that, deontology focuses solely on
the morality of the action itself. We design an online experiment in
order to investigate the effect of market interaction on moral deci-
sion making in a subsequent moral dilemma. Taking into account how
markets make cost benefit considerations salient, we hypothesize that
individuals are more likely to focus on consequences if they interacted
in a market before.
JEL classification: D91, L1
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1 Introduction
The discussion about the effects of market interaction on moral behavior can
be traced back to Hume and Smith1. For some time, the dominant opin-
ion was that markets improve mutual understanding and cooperation (e.g.
Montesquieu, 1749; Smith, 1761, 1776). However, other researchers started
to promote the thesis that markets erode moral behavior (e.g. Veblen, 1899;
Schumpeter, 1942; Hayek, 1948). They claim that market competition pro-
motes the “winner-take-all” mentality, decreases concerns for others and lets
people treat moral issues in terms of cost and benefits (Chen, 2011). In recent
years, this debate resurfaced and economists contributed with numerous the-
oretical (e.g. Bowles, 1998; Shleifer, 2004) and experimental studies. Some
of these experimental studies find that market interaction indeed decreases
the concern for others (e.g. Falk and Szech, 2013; Bartling et al., 2014) while
others find a moral enhancing effect of markets (e.g. Henrich et al., 2001;
Francois et al., 2009).
Most of this work in economics does not distinguish between preferences
over the consequences of an action and the moral costs of taking the action.
However, some economists (e.g. Alger and Weibull, 2013; Falk and Tirole,
2016; Casal et al., 2016; Bartling and Özdemir, 2017; Chen and Schonger,
2017) started to consider concepts of morality which originate from philoso-
phy and explicitly distinguish between these two aspects of an action.
There are two fundamentally different concepts in philosophy on how to
evaluate the morality of an action: consequentialism and deontology. These
concepts can take opposing views on whether an action is morally right or
wrong. Immanuel Kant importantly shaped the theory of deontology, which
suggests that the morality of an action must be evaluated by the action itself
(Kant, 1870/1785, 1872/1788). That means, for example, one should kill
under no circumstances since killing is not conform with moral norms. In
contrast, according to consequentialism (to which utilitarianism belongs), the
morality of an action is evaluated by its consequences. That is, killing is bad,
but if by killing one person, the death of several other persons can be pre-
1For a collection of early statements on the effects of markets on culture see Hirschman
(1977) and Hirschman (1982).
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vented, killing is considered to be morally right. Evidence shows that many
people consider both in their decisions, the consequences and the moral costs
of an action (e.g. Ritov and Baron, 1999; Bartels, 2008; Chen and Schonger,
2017). Those individuals choose an action which contradicts moral norms if
the effect on consequences is sufficiently beneficial. Such a consequentialist-
deontological type might for example not kill one person in order to save two
persons but is willing to kill one person to save three. In one situation he
behaves according to deontological principles whereas in another he makes
decisions according to consequentialism.
We do not intend to take a stance for either moral concept. However, it
is important to distinguish between the different concepts, since pure conse-
quentialist logic - which predominated the economic literature for a long time
- sometimes fails to explain observed behavior. Furthermore, “theorists argue
over deontological and consequentialist theories for criminal policy, contract
law, property rights, procedural justice, constitutional interpretation and in-
ternational law.” (Chen 2011, p.4).
Whether decision makers apply either deontological or consequentialist
principles is influenced by the context. Paxton et al. (2012) find that complet-
ing a Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas
increases consequentialist responding, i.e. individuals who reflected more on
the CRT made more consequentialist judgments. Also emotions can influ-
ence which of the two concepts is used in moral decision making. Negative
emotions lead to more deontological decisions (Wheatley and Haidt, 2005),
the unavailability of emotions comes along with more consequentialist moral
judgments (Koenigs et al., 2007). Greene et al. (2001) show how a higher
emotional involvement changes decision making. Capraro and Sippel (2017)
find that women are more likely than men to apply the deontological con-
cept when emotions are salient in the moral dilemma. The effect of cultural
differences is reported by Gold et al. (2014) and Hauser et al. (2007). Such
context dependence shows that studying the determinants of moral judgment
is of high relevance.
While other studies concentrate on the question whether moral behavior
can persist in markets, we investigate whether and how the experience of
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interacting in a market influences moral decision making outside the market,
i.e. in subsequent decisions.
We design an online experiment in which we let participants play either a
market or a non-market game and subsequently confront them with a hypo-
thetical moral dilemma in order to elicit their moral preferences. By letting
participants play a market game, more specifically a double auction, we in-
tend to shift the participants’ mindset towards cost-benefit considerations.
This is related to the method of priming from social psychology which ar-
gues that the use of a concept in one task increases the probability of using
the same concept in a subsequent, unrelated task (Bargh and Chartrand,
2000). Economists have started to adapt this method to experimental eco-
nomics (e.g. Benjamin et al., 2010; Chen, 2011; Cohn and Maréchal, 2016).
Benjamin et al. (2010) show that priming can influence the salience of at-
tributes, which in turn influences the primed individual’s preferences. Their
results are in line with the hypothesis that the salience of an attribute in-
creases the weight that is given to this attribute. Instead of the traditional
way of priming, which induces a mindset for example by letting participants
think or read about a market, we let them have the experience of market in-
teraction directly. In a market, individuals are confronted with cost-benefit
considerations. We conjecture that such an experience makes consequences
salient. We consider salience together with the moral preferences from Chen
and Schonger (2017) to derive our hypothesis. Individuals who only care for
the consequences or only care for the action itself should not be influenced
by salience and therefore do not react to a change in the mindset. How-
ever, individuals with preferences for both attributes are influenced. Market
priming, and thus salient consequences, shifts their moral decisions towards
consequentialism.
Giving a higher weight to consequences would imply that certain values
or norms (such as you should not lie or steal), that can only become manifest
in an action but do not translate into consequences, would lose importance
and vanish in decision-making processes. Focusing on consequences could
therefore make decisions generally more efficient but less moral from a deon-
tological perspective.
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In a related study, Chen (2011) investigates the effect of labor competi-
tion on moral decision making. He finds that the effect of competition on
moral decisions is affected by how participants relate to markets. In order to
account for such a moderator effect of different attitudes towards markets,
we use the Fair Market Ideology (FMI) scale of Jost et al. (2003).
The results of the experiment will significantly depend on whether we
succeed in changing the mindset of individuals by the use of traditional be-
havioral games. In order to verify a shift towards a market mindset, we will
apply a manipulation check to a sub-sample of our study participants. The
manipulation check consists of a word completion task and is designed such
that it should detect changes in mindsets regarding markets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section,
we give an overview over the recent literature about the effect of markets
on morality and other determinants of moral judgment. In Section 3, we
describe the design of the experiment. Section 4 introduces the preferences
from Chen and Schonger (2017) and shows how salience affects them. In
Section 5, we derive our hypotheses and Section 6 presents the pre-analysis
plan. Section 7 discusses limitations and Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature
As mentioned in the Introduction, some experiments find that markets have
a detrimental effect on moral behavior. Several of these experimental stud-
ies consider moral behavior defined as concerns for negative externalities of
trade. Those studies analyze the prevalence of moral behavior when vary-
ing different influential aspects of a market: competition, diffusion of re-
sponsibility, social information and market framing. Plott (1983) find that
experimental markets converge to the competitive equilibrium even if trade
induces a negative externality of trading for all other market participants.
Participants seem to just ignore the externality. Sutter et al. (2016) find
that if trade has a negative externality on a third party, volume of trade is
reduced but prices in the market depend rather on the relative number of
buyers and sellers and not on the existence of a negative externality. Falk
and Szech (2013) let participants of their experiment play a double auction
4
and vary the degree of competition by increasing the number of participants
in a market. Participants bargain over the live of a mouse and it turns
out that they are more willing to sacrifice the mouse if competition is high.
Bartling et al. (2014) consider an experimental market where trade leads to
a negative externality to a third party. They find that social concerns pre-
vail in a market but decrease in the degree of competition. Bartling et al.
(2017) use the same setting and vary the degree of diffusion of the negative
externality. They find that such diffusion leaves the level of social concerns
almost unaffected. Irlenbusch and Saxler (2015) run an experiment and try
to disentangle three characteristics of markets: diffusion of responsibility, so-
cial information and market framing. In contrast to Bartling et al. (2017),
they find that diffusion of responsibility makes participants rather accept the
presence of negative externalities. The same effect is found if transactions
are framed as markets. Social information in turn increases social concerns.
Reeson and Tisdell (2010) report less contributions to a public good if the
game is framed as a market. These studies have considered moral decision
making in the market, whereas we consider moral decision making after mar-
ket interaction. Such subsequent decision making has also been investigated
by other researchers. Brandts and Riedl (2017) compare the effect of favor-
able and unfavorable experience in a market on the willingness to cooperate
in a social dilemma game. They find that cooperation decreases if partici-
pants play the social dilemma game with participants from the same market
but increases if participants were in a different market before. This suggests
that the experience of competing with one another has a negative effect on
cooperation. Cappelen et al. (2007) let participants play a dictator game in
which they can contribute what they produced before in a production stage
where participants can invest and get a return. Compared to the situation
when participants were just endowed with some money, they find a signif-
icant reduction in the concerns for fairness in the dictator game. Hoffman
et al. (1994) find the same effect when framing the pre-dictator-game-stage
in terms of a market. Furthermore, giving a price to moral behavior can
crowd out intrinsic motivation (e.g. Frey et al., 1996; Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Mellström and Johannesson, 2008;
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Bowles, 2008). Researchers also find that making people think of money
makes them behave more individualistic (e.g. Vohs et al., 2006; Kube et al.,
2012).
However, there are also studies that find markets lead to more moral be-
havior in the market. Pigors and Rockenbach (2016) run a lab experiment
with consumers who buy a product from a firm that produces at a certain
wage paid to its workers. They vary the opaqueness of the production pro-
cess to the consumers and whether there is competition between firms. It
turns out that social responsibility (i.e. caring for the wage of the produc-
tion workers) only arises if there is supplier competition. Other studies find
that markets also lead to more moral behavior in subsequent decisions. In
an experimental study with 15 small-scale societies, Henrich et al. (2001)
find that there are higher fairness and cooperation in communities with a
higher market integration. Buser and Dreber (2014) also find that market
priming increases the willingness to cooperate. Furthermore, market priming
increases the weight participants give to efficiency and the trust in strangers
(Al-Ubaydli et al., 2013).
Hence, there are contradicting results when considering moral decision
making in the market and in subsequent decisions. One characteristic of the
presented studies is that they typically use a concept of preferences over final
payoffs in order to define moral behavior. This can be inequality aversion,
preferences for efficiency or a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off.
Together with self-interest, these preferences all belong to a consequential-
ist view of morality. Most of the literature thus only considers whether
the market changes preferences within the consequentialist view, e.g. from
other-regarding preferences to self-regarding preferences, without taking into
account whether the moral costs of the action itself change. In contrast to
that, we explicitly distinguish between the consequences and the moral costs
of an action, i.e. between the concepts of consequentialism and deontology.
Bartling and Özdemir (2017) and Casal et al. (2016) also distinguish between
these concepts. Bartling and Özdemir (2017) investigate the possibility that
if one refrains from a selfish action that induces a negative externality, an-
other market actor could step in. From a consequentialist perspective, an
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action that imposes negative externalities is not immoral if another person
would impose the same externality otherwise. However, deontologists would
argue that the action itself is immoral. Bartling and Özdemir (2017) find
that participants are more likely to take the selfish action if no social norm
exists. This suggests that social norms increase the importance of the moral
costs of the action. Casal et al. (2016) consider a three-player ultimatum
game and find that responders’ concerns for negative externalities increase if
they are better informed about the externality.
While Bartling and Özdemir (2017) consider moral decision making in
markets, we contribute to the discussion by investigating whether the experi-
ence of interacting in a market influences moral decision making in subsequent
problems that are unrelated to the market. Our study is thus closely related
to Chen (2011), who considers the effect of labor competition on subsequent
moral decision making.
In order to derive our hypotheses, we use the preferences of Chen and
Schonger (2017), who model deontological preferences as lexicographic. Other
economists also model deontological value choices (e.g. Alger and Weibull,
2013; Falk and Tirole, 2016). Stringham (2011) provides an overview of dif-
ferent ways of modeling morals, for example as internal constraints or as
preferences (e.g. White, 2004; Rabin, 1995; Zamir and Medina, 2008). Fur-
thermore, he discusses where internal constraints might come from.
As mentioned in the Introduction, several factors have been found to
have an impact on moral decision making. Greene et al. (2009) find that
spatial distance plays a role. Physical contact between the decision maker
and the victim has been considered by Cushman et al. (2006). Sinnott-
Armstrong (2008) study the temporal order of events. Costa et al. (2014)
show that using a foreign language makes individuals rather respond ac-
cording to consequentialist principles. The consequences are also relevant
for decision making, which corresponds to the theory that some individuals
consider both, the consequences and the action. An increasing number of
lives that can be saved increases the probability of consequentalist decisions
(Bartels, 2008). Furthermore, the relation/closeness to the victims matter
(Kurzban et al., 2012). Swann Jr et al. (2010) find that the lives of ingroup
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members are valued more than the lives of outgroup members. Competition
in the labor market right before making a moral decision makes individuals
rather decide deontological if they have negative emotions towards the mar-
ket (Chen, 2011). We add to the discussion of the determinants of moral
decision making by investigating the effect of market interaction.
3 Design
The study will be conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a la-
bor market intermediary (see e.g. Horton et al., 2011). We implement the
experiment with the software o-Tree (Chen et al., 2016). In the first stage,
participants are randomly assigned to either a market game (experimental
treatment) or a non-market game (control treatment). In the second stage,
we confront participants with a moral dilemma in order to elicit their moral
preferences. Finally, participants fill in a questionnaire.
After the market/non-market game, we let a sub-sample of the partic-
ipants do a word completion task, which serves as a manipulation check.
Thereby, we verify whether the market game indeed succeeds in shifting par-
ticipants’ mindset towards cost-benefit considerations.
The study is designed to be between-participants in order to rule out po-
tential confounding interaction effects between the various design elements.
That means that each participant will only participate in one of the two treat-
ments (either market or non-market). A sufficient number of observations
and a proper randomization procedure guarantee causal interpretations.2
2A power analysis with power 0.9 shows that we need a minimum sample size of 445
participants per treatment to find an effect of 10%-points. We used a baseline share of
consequentialist decisions of 37%. This share was found in a pretest on MTurk in which
we presented the moral dilemma to 109 participants without previous manipulation.
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3.1 Market game
“Markets are institutions where sellers and buyers interact and can trade
items. Trade occurs whenever a seller and a buyer agree on a price.” (Falk and
Szech 2013, p.707) Following Falk and Szech (2013) and other researchers, we
choose a double auction to represent a market. Double auctions incorporate
several typical market aspects such as e.g. the privacy of the own valuation
of the good, the interaction and competition among participants and the
consideration of costs and benefits of a good. Asks, bids and occurring
trades are public information. These auctions are well known for their rapid
convergence towards the competitive equilibrium and their high efficiency
(Ketcham et al., 1984).
We base the design of the double auction on a computerized version of
Smith (1962). 18 participants are assigned to one auction (market) with 9
buyers and 9 sellers of a fictional good and 10 trading rounds. At the begin-
ning of each round, each buyer privately learns his valuation v of the good
and each seller learns her production costs c. The valuations are randomly
drawn from the set {30, 40, 50, . . . , 110} and the costs are randomly drawn
from the set {10, 20, 30, . . . , 90}. In the standard double auction, the valu-
ation and costs are the same in each round. In contrast to that, we follow
Cason and Friedman (1996) and Kagel (2004) and make a random draw in
every round. This should make the market interaction more interesting and
more similar among buyers and sellers. In each round, every value from the
sets can appear only once among the buyers and sellers. The demand D
and supply S at the beginning of each round are thus commonly known and
depicted in Figure 1. In the competitive equilibrium, the equilibrium price
p∗ is equal to 60 and there are 5 to 6 trades.
Sellers are told that they can sell one unit of the fictional good in each
round. When the market opens, sellers can submit asks, i.e. the price at
which they are willing to sell the product. The asks appear in a table la-
beled “Current bids and asks”, which is visible to all market participants.
Simultaneously, buyers are told that they can buy one unit of the fictional
good in each round. Buyers can submit bids, i.e. the price at which they
are willing to buy one unit of the good. The bids also appear in the table
9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
D
S
trades
price
Figure 1: Demand and supply in double auction market.
“Current bids and asks”. Figure 2 shows the double auction screen for a
buyer. A trade occurs if a seller submits an ask that is lower than a current
bid in the table or if a buyer submits a bid that is higher than a current ask.
The trade is made at the price that was in the table first. Furthermore, a
trade occurs if a seller/buyer directly accepts a bid/ask from the table. As
long as they did not trade, buyers and sellers can change their bids/asks as
many times as they wish until the market closes. If a trade occurs, a buyer’s
payoff is πB = valuation - price. A seller’s payoff is πB = price - costs. If
no trade occurs, payoffs are zero, i.e. the valuation and production costs
only materialize in case of trade. After each trading round, participants re-
ceive feedback about their payoff and the trading prices in that round. Each
participant takes part in 10 trading rounds. One round is randomly drawn
at the end of the experiment to determine the amount that is added to the
participant’s participation fee.
It is challenging to predict the behavior of participants in a double auc-
tion theoretically. However, experimental evidence shows that there is a rapid
convergence towards the competitive equilibrium in the standard version of
the double auction with constant valuation and costs over all rounds and un-
10
Figure 2: Double auction screen for a buyer
known distribution (e.g. Smith, 1962). Such rapid convergence has also been
found given known distribution of v and c and random draws of valuations
and costs in each round (Cason and Friedman, 1996; Kagel, 2004).
A soon as the competitive equilibrium has been reached, we can deter-
mine the ex-ante expected payoff per round in equilibrium. In the competi-
tive equilibrium, buyers and sellers with high valuations / low costs for the
good end up trading. The expected price is p∗ = 60. Before learning her
production costs, a seller expects to have costs above the equilibrium price
with probability 3
9
. She will then expect not to trade and has zero payoff.
With probability 6
9
, a seller will have costs lower or equal to the equilib-
rium price and can sell the good. A seller thus has the ex-ante expected
payoff of 6
9
E[p∗ − c|c ≤ 60] = 50/3. A buyer has the ex-ante probability
of 6
9
that he has a valuation above or equal to the equilibrium price and
buys at price p∗. With probability 3
9
, a buyer has a valuation lower than the
equilibrium price and does not buy. The expected payoff of a buyer is thus
6
9
E[v − p∗|v ≥ 60] = 50/3. The ex-ante expected variance of the payoff in
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equilibrium amounts to 3
9
(0 − 50
3
)2 + 6
9
E[(p∗ − c − 50
3
)2|c ≤ 60] = 1000
3
for a
seller and 3
9
(0− 50
3
)2 + 6
9
E[(v − p∗ − 50
3
)2|v ≥ 60] = 1000
3
for a buyer.
In the competitive equilibrium, there are at most six trades per round.
To give participants sufficient time to decide and trade, each market round
lasts 60 seconds3.
3.2 Non-market game
We designed a non-market game which serves as a baseline to the market.
The interaction and competition between participants are two crucial aspects
of a market setting, as well as the focus on costs and benefit. While these
aspects should be ruled out in a non-market setting, we want to keep constant
the risk (same expected income and same variance) and the group feeling.
Furthermore, the cognitive depletion/load should be similar since it has been
found that cognitive load can have an impact on moral judgment (Greene
et al., 2008).
We thus let participants play 10 rounds of the following lottery game:
Participants are assigned to groups of 9. In each round, participants are
asked to guess a number out of the set L ∈ {20, 30, 40, . . . , 100}. Afterwards,
a random device allocates every value of the set L to one of the participants
in the group. If the guess coincides with the allocated value, the participant
receives a winning payoff of πW = 50. Otherwise, the losing payoff is
πL =

0 with prob. 1/2
10 with prob. 1/8
20 with prob. 1/8
30 with prob. 1/8
40 with prob. 1/8.
(1)
The expected payoff in each round of the lottery is equal to E[π] =
1
9
· 50 + 8
9
· 1
8
(10 + 20 + 30 + 40) = 50
3
, i.e. identical to the ex-ante expected
payoff in equilibrium in the market game. The expected variance in each
round is equal to E[(π− 50
3
)2] = 1000
3
. The expected payoff and the expected
variance of the payoff are thus equivalent in the market and non-market
3Plott and Gray (1990) suggest 8 seconds per equilibrium trade as a rule of thumb for
the round length in computerized double auctions.
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game. Similar to the market game each participant receives feedback about
the assigned number and the resulting payoff in that round. At the end of the
experiment, one of the 10 rounds is randomly chosen to count for payment.
In this non-market game, participants do not compete or interact. Fur-
thermore, they get a benefit without having to pay anything and they are
not confronted with market terminology. However, the lottery incorporates
the same risk and should also create a group feeling through the draw of the
random number.
Since there is no direct interaction in the lottery, participants play the
10 rounds a lot faster than the 10 rounds of the double auction. In order to
keep the depletion as constant as possible, we let participants of the lottery
group play a real effort task before they enter the lottery. This real effort
task is not incentivized since it has the mere purpose of making depletion
similar in the two treatments.
Bartling et al. (2014) use an alternative non-market treatment in which
they ask participants to choose a distribution of payoffs between three play-
ers. In Falk and Szech (2013)’s non-market condition, participants are asked
to decide whether they would prefer to receive CHF 10 or to save the life of
a mouse. Both studies try to create a non-market environment where deci-
sions are comparable to the decisions in the market environment. However,
it is difficult in our setting to let participants make the same distributional
decisions since the double auction results in rather complicated interactions.
Furthermore, we do not focus on the decisions in but on the decisions after
the market/non-market interaction.
3.3 Manipulation check
Following e.g. Tulving et al. (1982), Bassili and Smith (1986) and Shu et al.
(2012), we use a word completion task in order to test whether the market
(non-market) game indeed results in a market (non-market) mindset. We
constructed the word completion task using the guidelines of Koopman et al.
(2013).
We present 14 word fragments in random order to the participants. Nine
of these word fragments (MA L, CAS , ONEY, AX, SUPP , SAL ,
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BR CH, DGET, and SH P) can be completed to words related to mar-
kets and trade (MALL, CASH, MONEY, TAX, SUPPLY, SALE, BRANCH,
BUDGET, and SHOP) or neutral words (as e.g. MAIL, CASE, HONEY,
FAX, SUPPER, SALT, BRUNCH, WIDGET, and SHIP). These words were
chosen such that without any treatment intervention before, at least 17% of
the participants fill in market-related words4. If the market interaction in-
deed manipulates the mindset, participants in the market treatment should
be more likely to complete these word fragments with market-related words
compared to participants in the non-market treatment. Another set of five
word fragments (FR T, T LE, BE , BREA , and CAB ) with
neutral meaning (e.g. FRUIT, TABLE, BEAR, BREACH, and CABLE) is
part of the manipulation check to see whether participants in the market
treatment and in the non-market treatment complete these word fragments
similarly. This allows us to exclude that the market interaction also affects
the completion of neutral words. Furthermore, it mitigates the problem that
filling in market-related words could also have a priming effect, leading to
a higher probability of filling in market-related words in subsequent word
fragments.
We interpret a higher share of market-related words in the market treat-
ment as a robustness check for the priming due to the experience of market
interaction.
4We conducted a pretest on Amazon MTurk with 98 participants to verify this. Koop-
man et al. (2013) suggest that at least 25% of the participants should fill in market-related
words. In our pretest, this was true for most of our market word fragments. Exceptions
were MA L and SH P, where only 17% filled in MALL and SHOP.
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3.4 Moral dilemma
After the treatment intervention (market or non-market game), we present
a moral dilemma to the participants that was first used by Thomson (1985).
This moral dilemma has been of interest to many researchers from philosophy
(Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985), neuroscience (Greene et al., 2001; Borg et al.,
2006; Ciaramelli et al., 2007), psychology (Cushman et al., 2006; Hauser
et al., 2007; Greene et al., 2009) and recently also from economics (e.g. Lanteri
et al., 2010; Chen, 2011; Barak-Corren et al., 2018), in order to study moral
decision making. The moral dilemma is as follows:
A boxcar breaks loose and is heading toward five workers on the tracks.
They do not have enough time to get off the track. However, the partici-
pant has the opportunity to save these workers. The participant could use a
lever to steer the boxcar to another track where only one worker is working.
Many experiments find, that a vast majority of participants would do so. In
contrast, most participants remain passive if, in order to save the workers,
they have to push a fat man down a platform. These results are very robust
(e.g. Petrinovich et al., 1993; Greene et al., 2001; Cushman et al., 2006) and
researchers worked a lot on arguing why there are such strong differences
between these situations. They argue that two factors are of special impor-
tance: physical involvement and the fact that in the push variant, the fat
man is used as means to an end. The moral costs of the action are then
especially high (Cushman et al., 2006).
In order to get a more balanced distribution of decisions to start with, we
use a variant of the train dilemma in which there is a person on a platform
above the tracks, standing on a trap door. The participant could open the
trap door such that the person would fall down on the tracks, slow down the
boxcar and thereby save the lives of three workers. Hence, there is no physical
involvement but the person on the platform is used as means to an end. This
variant has been used for example by Greene et al. (2009), Schwitzgebel and
Cushman (2015) and Everett et al. (2016). They all find that in this moral
problem, deontological and consequentialist answers and/or ratings are more
balanced than in the lever or the push variant. The trapdoor variant allows
eliciting whether people are willing to use others as means to an end with-
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out the emotional salience that comes from the physical involvement. The
dilemma can be illustrated as in Figure 3. Together with the figure, partici-
Figure 3: Moral Dilemma - Trapdoor
pants are presented the following instructions and have to decide whether to
actively intervene or whether to stay passive (the instructions are taken with
slight adaptations from Barak-Corren et al. (2018)):
You are working by the train tracks when you see a boxcar filled with
coal break loose and speed down the tracks. The boxcar is heading toward
three workers who do not have enough time to get off the track. Above the
track is a platform with another worker. This worker is not threatened by
the boxcar. However, he is standing over a trap door.
You have two options:
Actively intervene: You use a switch that opens the trap door and
drops the one worker in front of the boxcar. Thereby, the worker’s body gets
caught in the wheels of the boxcar and slows it down. As a consequence, the
one worker dies and the three workers stay unharmed.
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Stay passive: You stay passive and let the boxcar head toward the three
workers. As a consequence, the worker over the trap door stays unharmed
and the three workers die.
Sidenote: In any case, you are sufficiently protected and stay unharmed.
Assume that you will not face any legal consequences for either action.
Now you are asked to take one of the above options. In order to do so,
imagine that you find yourself in the previously described situation. Please
accept only the information given and try not to introduce additional as-
sumptions that go beyond the problem as stated.
In contrast to many other studies, we ask participants what they would do
rather than what they consider to be the morally right thing to do. Several
researchers found differences in answers to these two questions (e.g. Kurzban
et al., 2012; Tassy et al., 2013; Gold et al., 2013, 2015). We add the question
about the morally right decision in the subsequent questionnaire. There
is some criticism of the external validity of the hypothetical moral trolley
problem. We will discuss this criticism in Section 7.
3.5 Questionnaire
As the last step, we elicit some socio-demographic data such as gender, age,
education, religion, nationality, native language and income. We also ask
them to rate their willingness to take risk and their trust in other people.
Market and trading experience is elicited by questions about the frequency
of trading at eBay or bargaining in markets. As a common procedure in
priming studies, we ask whether participants were aware of the purpose of
the study, especially of our intention of priming.
We add the questionnaire from Jost et al. (2003) to elicit the participants’
attitude towards markets. This measure of fair market ideology was also used
by Bartling et al. (2014). Participants have to rate their agreement with 15
statements about the market procedure and the fairness of 10 statements
about market outcomes. This allows us to assess possible negative or positive
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emotions towards markets. Furthermore, we ask participants whether they
think they did well in the market/lottery game and we ask them to rate their
mood during the experiment. These two questions should capture emotions
towards the experience in the experiment. The complete questionnaire can
be found in the Appendix.
3.6 Procedural details
We plan to conduct the experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk with a
total of 1200 participants. 500 participants will take part in the non-market
treatment, 500 participants will take part in the market treatment. 200
additional participants will be presented with the manipulation check directly
after the market / non-market game (100 participants per treatment). We
use the software oTree (Chen et al., 2016) to program the experiment. We
will conduct one treatment with 18 participants per session. We will invite
the participants via MTurk. Sessions are expected to last 45 minutes on
average. For the market treatment, we need 18 participants to start at the
same time. In order to reduce the waiting time for the first arrivers and thus
to reduce drop-outs, we will fill the empty spots with automated players
(“bots”) 10 minutes after the arrival of the first participant. After reading
the instructions, participants will be asked to answer some control questions
to make sure they understood the rules of the game. Only participants who
complete all parts of the experiment receive payment. They will be payed
via their MTurk account. Participants’ expected earnings are $5 on average
across sessions, with a participation fee of $3.
4 Theory
Chen and Schonger (2017) distinguish between three types of preferences:
consequentalist, deontological and consequentialist-deontological preferences.
We use their definition of the types.
Definition 1 (Consequentialist preferences). A preference is consequentialist
if there exists a utility representation u such that u = u(x).
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x = x(d) represents the consequences of a decision d. Next to one’s own
payoff, it also includes e.g. reputation and others’ payoffs.
In the moral dilemma described before, an individual with consequential-
ist preferences would prefer to actively intervene (A) and open the trap door
over staying passive (P) if and only if
u1(x1(A)) ≥ u1(x1(P )). (2)
Assuming that the consequentialist prefers less over many deaths, he would
always choose to actively intervene (A).
For a deontologist, preferences are lexicographic. The preferences over de-
cisions depend on the decision d itself. If an individual is indifferent between
two decisions, consequences x are considered.
Definition 2 (Deontological preferences). A preference is called deontological
if there exist u, f such that u = u(d), and f = f(x), and for all (x, d), (x′, d′):
(x, d) % (x′, d′) if and only if u(d) > u(d′) or [u(d) = u(d′) and f(x) ≥ f(x′)].
There is evidence that actively deciding to kill someone rather than letting
it happen, is considered as more immoral (Cushman et al., 2006; Moore
et al., 2008). Hence, we consider actively intervening as more painful to a
deontologist than staying passive:
u2(A) = −M2(A) < −M2(P ) = u2(P ). (3)
where M2(d) are the moral costs of decision d for a deontologist. A deontol-
ogist would thus always choose to stay passive (P) and does not care for the
consequences.
There is a third type whose utility function incorporates both: conse-
quences x and the moral costs from decision d.
Definition 3 (Consequentialist-deontological preferences). A preference is
consequentialist-deontological if there exists a utility representation u such
that u = u(x, d).
We consider an additive utility function u3(x, d) = x3(d)−M3(d), where
x3(d) are the consequences and M3(d) are the moral costs of decision d for
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the consequentialist-deontological type. Such a type would choose to become
active, if and only if the difference in utility from consequences is higher than
the difference of moral costs:
u3(A) = x3(A)−M3(A) ≥ x3(P )−M3(P ) = u3(P ) (4)
⇔ x3(A)− x3(P ) ≥M3(A)−M3(P ).
For the consequentialist-deontological type, we again need the assumption
that he prefers less over many deaths. He would choose to become active if
the improvement in consequences becomes more important than the cost of
taking an immoral decision.
A psychological concept used by several economists (e.g. Kőszegi and Ra-
bin, 2006; Bordalo et al., 2013) suggests that individuals focus on attributes
which are more salient. We follow the model of salience-driven preferences
of Bordalo et al. (2013) and assume that individuals indeed give a higher
weight to the attribute that has a higher salience.
Changing the weights of consequences and moral costs has no influence
on the decision of pure consequentialists and pure deontologists since they
only consider one attribute in their decision. However, it has an influence
on the decision of consequentialist-deontological types. If consequences are
salient, the moral costs are discounted with δ ∈ (0, 1]:
u3(d) = x3(d)− δM3(d). (5)
If the moral costs from the decisions are salient, consequences are dis-
counted with δ ∈ (0, 1]:
u3(d) = δx3(d)−M3(d). (6)
Given consequences are salient, consequentialist-deontological types are
more willing to actively intervene:
u3(A) = x3(A)− δM3(A) ≥ x3(P )− δM3(P ) = u3(P ) (7)
⇔ x3(A)− x3(P ) ≥ δ[M3(A)−M3(P )].
This condition is more likely to be satisfied than condition (5) and hence we
would expect more active interventions if consequences are salient.
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There are different theories about what determines the salience of an
attribute. Bordalo et al. (2013) argue that an attribute has a higher salience
if it varies more within the choice set. We do not argue against the effect
of variation on salience. However, since all participants consider the same
moral dilemma, the variation within attributes remains constant between our
treatments and should thus not play a role. Researchers from psychology and
economics (Benjamin et al., 2010) argue that priming can affect the salience
of attributes. Evidence is provided by Benjamin et al. (2010), who use a
similar model in order to explain the influence of priming on the choice
of individuals. In their model, an individual’s utility has two parts: first,
they get disutility from choosing another than their individually preferred
action. Second, they get disutility from departing from the preferred action
of their social category. Benjamin et al. (2010) argue that priming the social
category increases the salience of the social category and thus the weight that
individuals give to the disutility from deviating from their social category’s
optimal choice.
5 Hypotheses
Our main hypothesis is based on the predictions we get from the preferences
of Chen and Schonger (2017) combined with a theory of salience. The hy-
pothesis that the experience of interacting in a market increases the share
of individuals who choose to become active corresponds to markets making
consequences salient.
Hypothesis 1. Participants who were exposed to the market environment
are more likely to make consequentialist decisions in the moral dilemma than
participants who were exposed to the non-market environment.
As explained before, the theory of priming says that if a concept was
used recently, it is more likely to be used in the next decision again. Bowles
(1998), Chen (2011) and other economists support the view that markets let
consumers focus on the cost-benefit concept and thus on consequences. Fol-
lowing Benjamin et al. (2010), this makes consequences salient in subsequent
decisions.
21
We follow the argumentation of Chen (2011) when we derive the second
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Market interaction leads to more consequentialist decisions
if participants have a positive attitude towards markets.
Chen (2011) argues that the affective state changes moral decision mak-
ing. When a person has positive associations with something, he rather uses
the concept of consequentialism (Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006) while neg-
ative emotions trigger more deontological decisions (Wheatley and Haidt,
2005). We measure the attitude of a participant towards markets with the
Fair Market Ideology scale in the questionnaire.
The performance in the treatment game could also have an influence on
emotions. This implies the following prediction:
Hypothesis 3. Better performance in the market/non-market game leads to
more consequentialist decisions.
Bowles (1998) suggests that the effect of market interaction can differ
significantly depending on whether a participant performs well or poorly in
the market. However, Brandts and Riedl (2017) find that positive experience
in the market only has a positive effect on the contributions in a social
dilemma if participants did not compete in the same market before.
6 Pre-analysis plan
In this section, we first describe the variables and then describe how we will
analyze the data and test our hypotheses.
We will exclude the observations of participants who did not correctly
answer the moral dilemma comprehension questions in the questionnaire.
Furthermore, we will only consider participants who played at least eight
rounds of the market/non-market game5.
5If a participant closes the browser, a bot takes his place and the game continues. If
the participant reopens the browser, he enters the game again.
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6.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 1 lists the variables that will be elicited, including their descriptions.
Variable Description
active Decision dummy: Decision in the moral dilemma:
0 - passive; 1 - active
market Treatment dummy: 0 - non-market; 1 - market
perform Average payoff in market/non-market game
mood Self-reported mood during the experiment:
from 1 - very bad to 5 - very good
fmi Mean of FMI scale (25 items): from -5 to 5
gender Self-reported gender: 0 - male; 1 - female; 2 - other
age Self-reported age
income Self-reported income: 0 - No answer; 1 - Less than $10,000;
2 - $10,000 to $19,999; ... ; 14 - $100,000 to $149,999;
15 - $150,000 or more
education Self-reported highest completed education:
1 - Less than High School;
2 - High School/GED; 3 - Some College (no degree);
4 - Bachelor’s Degree; 5 - Master’s Degree;
6 - Advanced Graduate work or Ph.D.; 7 - Other
trust Self-reported trust attitude: from 0 - “You can’t be too careful”
to 10 - “Most people can be trusted”
Table 1: List of variables.
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Variable Description
risk Self-reported risk attitude rank: from
0 - “not at all willing to take risks”
to 10 - “very willing to take risks”
nation Self-reported nationality: 1 - US American; 0 - Other
english Self-reported native language: 1 - English; 0 - Other
religious Self-reported frequency of attendance of religious services:
1 - Never; 2 - Once a year; 3 - Once a month; 4 - Once a week;
5 - Multiple times a week
familiar Self-reported familiarity with “moral trolley problem” dummy:
0 - No; 1 - Yes
Table 1: List of variables (continued).
We define the variable performi as the average payoff across all periods
of participant i in the market/non-market game. Furthermore, the variable
fmii is constructed by participant i’s average rating of the 25 items of the
fairness market ideology scale. We will also have information about the
number of bots in a market, the number of trades per round and the trading
prices.
In order to test for successful randomization, we will compare the ex-
planatory variables between the two treatments. More specifically, we will
use Fisher’s exact tests for gender and Mann-Whitney U test6 to verify that
income, education, and age do not differ significantly between the two treat-
ments.
We will also compare drop-out rates in the treatments with a Mann-
Whitney U test. If drop-out rates differ systematically, we have to conclude
that there was different attrition in the two treatments.
6The parametric alternative of a t-test requires the variable to be interval scaled and to
be normally distributed in the population. Throughout the analysis, we will use the t-test
instead of the Mann-Whitney U test whenever we can verify that these two requirements
are satisfied.
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6.2 Market game
We are not primarily interested in the behavior of participants in the double
auction directly. However, it is still important to look at the price and trading
dynamics in order to test whether the markets converge to the competitive
equilibrium. If they converge, we can be confident that payoffs in the market
and the non-market treatment are distributed approximately equally.
We will use one-sample t-tests to compare the prices and the number of
trades in the last trading periods with the equilibrium price of 60 and the
equilibrium number of trades between 5 and 6. The coefficient of conver-
gence α of a trading round is the ratio of the standard deviation of prices
to the predicted equilibrium price (in percentage). α is thus a measure of
exchange price variation relative to the predicted equilibrium exchange price.
α is predicted to decline with trading periods. The efficiency of the market is
defined as the sum of realized incomes divided by the maximal aggregate in-
come. Efficiency should increase in the number of periods and approximately
reach 100%. We will test the predictions of convergence using random effects
regressions on a linear time trend with clustered standard errors on market
level.
The convergence to the competitive equilibrium is of relevance since we
designed the payoffs in the non-market game such that the payoff distribu-
tions are equal in expectation. We can also test directly whether the expected
payoff of participants is indeed 50
3
with a one-sample t-test. We expect it to
be smaller since the competitive equilibrium is typically only approximated
(at least in some periods).
6.3 Moral dilemma
In order to test our main hypothesis, we will compare the shares of active
and passive decisions in the market and in the non-market treatment. If
the randomization works properly, the difference in shares will be caused by
the treatment intervention. We will test whether the difference in shares
is statistically significant with a Fisher’s exact test. We will interpret a
significant difference as evidence for our hypothesis that market interaction
lets participants rather make decisions according to consequentialism.
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We will also compare the shares to the results from the pre-study on
MTurk with 109 participants. Without any manipulation before the trap
door moral dilemma, we found that 37% of the participants chose to actively
intervene.
6.4 Regression analysis
We will run logit regressions in order to test our hypotheses more rigorously.
We will cluster standard errors on the market/lottery level to account for
possible correlation of the error term across participants from the same mar-
ket or the same lottery. Furthermore, we will include session dummies to
account for fixed effects due to dynamics particular to each market session
(as for example the number of bots).
The dependent variable activei is a dummy variable that is 1 if participant
i chose to actively intervene in the moral dilemma and 0 if participant i stayed
passive. The probability that participant i chooses to actively intervene given
Xi is
P (activei = 1|Xi) =
exp(X ′iβ)
1 + exp(X ′iβ)
, (8)
where Xi is a vector with all explanatory variables and a constant. The
marginal effect of explanatory variable l is
∂P (activei = 1|Xi)
∂Xil
= βl
exp(X ′iβ)
1 + exp(X ′iβ)
. (9)
The marginal effect depends on the level of X. We will report marginal
effects evaluated at means. When Xil is a dummy variable, the marginal
effect is defined as
P (activei = 1|Xil = 1, Xi)− P (activei = 1|Xil = 0, Xi). (10)
We will run logit regressions, where we add additional explanatory vari-
ables step by step. In the first logit regression, Xi will consist solely of the
market dummy marketi. In a second step, we want to test the hypothesis
that the attitude towards markets moderates the effect of market interaction.
Controlling for such moderator variables is especially important if the effect
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goes in opposite directions. We will add the fairness market ideology measure
fmii and an interaction variable fmii#marketi. The interaction variable
captures the effect of market attitude given a participant was assigned to
the market treatment. Our hypothesis 2 suggests that fmii#marketi has a
positive effect on the probability of actively intervening.
Since the argument that negative/positive emotions affect moral decision
making also holds for participants in the non-market treatment, we will run
a third logit regression and add the variables moodi and performi and their
interactions with marketi to the explanatory variables. These variables cap-
ture the self-reported mood during the experiment and the performance of
the participant in the market/non-market game. We will interpret positive
coefficients for these variables as further evidence for our hypothesis 3.
Finally, we estimate the model including the control variables gender,
age, religion, nationality, native language, income, employment, trust, risk
aversion and market experience.
6.5 Manipulation check
The manipulation check serves as a robustness check for the priming of par-
ticipants. Each participant could maximally fill in 9 market-related words
out of 14 words in total. We will construct a market-priming-score which is
computed simply by the number of completed market-related words (hence
from 0 to 9). Afterwards, we will compare the average number of individual
scores between treatments. In addition, we compare both mean scores with
our baseline mean score from the pretest without manipulation stage.
In the baseline study with 98 participants and no priming, we found a
mean score of 3.49. We will test for the significance of the differences with
a Mann-Whitney U test. We expect that the mean score in the non-market
treatment does not significantly differ from the baseline, whereas the mean
score in the market treatment is significantly higher than both other mean
scores.
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7 Limitations
The attempt to prime participants through experimental games is a new
method and is different from previous approaches7. We are aware of the
fact that by explaining the double auction, several market-related words are
pinned in the recognition memory and make it easier to be recognized in
the manipulation check. We counter this effect by using only market-related
words which were not used in the instructions or appeared in the instructions
of both treatments.
Cohn and Maréchal (2016) raise some other worries when it comes to
priming. First, several priming studies could not be replicated (Yong, 2012).
Second, there is doubt on whether priming really works through the proposed
mechanism. They suggest mitigating the latter by using a manipulation
check, which we will implement with the word completion task. The problem
of replication can be reduced by the provision of all material necessary for
replication.
Another possible confounding factor is that cognitive depletion might
have an influence on moral decisions (Greene et al., 2008). The transcription
task and the lottery might not cause the same cognitive depletion as the
double auction and this could result in different decisions. However, one
could argue that cognitive depletion is also present in a real market and is
thus illustrated realistically by the experimental double auction.
Several studies question the external validity of the moral trolley problem
because of its hypothetical nature (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Bauman et al.,
2014; Gold et al., 2015). Bauman et al. (2014) revisit the external validity
of moral trolley problems, observing that 1) participants are often amused,
2) trolley problems differ from moral problems which are encountered in
reality and 3) that they elicit different psychological processes than real-world
situations. Several researchers try to make the moral problems more realistic.
Gold et al. (2013) and Gold et al. (2015) introduce trolley problems with
economic incentives and real-life consequences. While harm in the traditional
7In one study e.g., participants had to arrange words to form a proper sentence. In one
condition the available words were neutral, in the other related to markets and trade (see
Al-Ubaydli et al. 2013).
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moral trolley problem is typically deaths, they generalize the problem to
economic harm. They find that the difference in moral judgments between
the lever and the push scenario remains high. Navarrete et al. (2012) let
participants play the lever scenario in a virtual reality environment and find
that 90.5% of the participants turn the trolley. This result is in line with the
90% typically found in the classic hypothetical moral trolley dilemma.
With our setting, we cannot make inferences about the long-run effect of
priming by market interactions. It would be interesting for further research
to investigate long-lasting effects by letting participants take moral decisions
repeatedly over time or by letting more time pass before presenting them
with the moral decision.
We will use the online labor market MTurk. Benefits are that experiments
are easy to implement and data can be generated at a low hourly pay of
the participants. Drawbacks are that the researcher cannot control for the
environment in which the participants are, whether they pay attention and
that participants are mainly from the US. However, Berinsky et al. (2012)
examine experimental data generated by Mechanical Turk users and find
that results are comparable to data generated in a common laboratory. This
is also reflected by numerous publications using Mechanical Turk data (e.g.
Ambuehl et al., 2015; Chandler and Kapelner, 2013; Dreber et al., 2013).
Real-time interaction has not been tried often on MTurk yet. A recent
paper by Arechar et al. (2018) discusses the methodological challenges. They
find that in spite of all the problems, results from a public goods game are
similar to the results in the laboratory. One problem of real-time interaction
is the drop-out of participants. In our double auction, 18 participants have to
be present at the same time in MTurk. We program bots which will take over
in case some participants drop out. These bots will make bids/asks equal to
their valuation/costs at a random point in time within a fixed (and commonly
known) time-frame. The bots will be indicated as such, so that participants
know whether they are playing with bots or real persons. However, our main
question is not about the behavior in the double auction and we expect that
the introduction of bots does not influence the experience of interacting in a
market.
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Instead of using a general subject pool, we could also test whether market
professionals are more consequentialist than non-professionals. However, we
would have to encounter the problem of self-selection. Furthermore, running
an online experiment in a non-field setting gives us more control over the
decision environment and the treatment intervention. Additionally, more
and more people all over the world gain access to markets and engage in
some form of market interactions. Understanding the influence of market
interaction on moral decision making is therefore especially important for a
general, representative subject pool.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an experimental design to test the hypothesis
that market interaction leads to more consequentialist decisions in a subse-
quent moral dilemma. The design also allows detecting possible moderator
effects of positive/negative emotions towards markets. Furthermore, the re-
sults of the experiment will give some insights on whether it is possible to
prime participants, i.e. to change their mindsets, by letting them play an
experimental game. This would have implications for experimental research
in general.
If market interaction indeed increases the weight that individuals give to
consequences, implications for general decision making depend on the prefer-
ences over consequences. If individuals only care for their own payoff, giving
a higher weight to consequences makes them more likely to engage in indi-
vidually profitable actions, even if these actions contradict moral norms as
e.g. imposing negative externalities, lying or not cooperating. If individuals
also care for the payoff of others, it might not necessarily be the case that
more immoral actions are taken. On the one hand, there are less concerns for
taking immoral actions. On the other hand, individuals might try to avoid
actions that have inefficient consequences.
It is possible that the experience of market interaction also has an effect
on other variables that are elicited in the questionnaire. For example, Al-
Ubaydli et al. (2013) would suggest that trust in other people is increased
by market interaction and Francois et al. (2009) show that higher market
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competition leads to higher trust.
Future research should concentrate on the effect of market interaction
on other moral dilemmas, e.g. whether participants are willing to lie in
order to improve consequences. Specifically, we could give one person the
opportunity to lie which increases his/her monetary payoff and the payoffs of
all players of his/her group (Erat and Gneezy, 2012). We would expect that
the salience of consequences increases the probability that a person is willing
to lie. This extends our study with a consequential/deontological choice to
an economically incentivized setting. Alternatively, the moral dilemma could
be made more realistic and incentivized non-economically, e.g. by physical
pain through electrical shocks. Instead of the hypothetical decisions on the
lives of workers, participants could be confronted with the decision whether
they let three other participants receive an electrical shock or whether they
actively decide that an outsider is shocked instead.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Instructions Double Auction
Welcome and thank you for your participation!
This is a study of decision-making. Please read the following instructions
carefully.
The study consists of 3 parts:
• Part 1: An interactive game
• Part 2: A decision scenario
• Part 3: A short questionnaire
We will explain each part of the study before the respective part will start.
You will receive a fixed participation reward of $3.00 at the end of part 3. In
part 1, you can earn additional points which will be converted to real money.
One point equals $0.20.
The money you will earn in part 1 will be added to the fixed participation
reward of $3.00. In parts 2 and 3, no additional money can be earned. You
must finish all 3 parts of the study to receive payment. You will receive a
personal code that allows you to receive your payment through MTurk at
the end of the study.
General rules
In this part, you will be interacting in an online market consisting of 9 buy-
ers and 9 sellers. These are real people interacting in real-time. You will be
randomly assigned to the role of a buyer or the role of a seller. You will keep
this role throughout the entire duration of the game. You will learn your role
after reading the instructions.
There will be 10 trading rounds in which you can earn points by trading.
One of these 10 rounds will be randomly chosen at the end of the study to
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count for your payment. In each of the 10 trading rounds, the market opens
for 60 seconds, during which trading between buyers and sellers is possible.
Figure 4: Market with buyers and sellers
What can a buyer do?
In each trading round, each buyer can buy one unit of a fictional good. By
buying and hence owning this good, buyers receive a benefit in terms of a
valuation. At the beginning of each trading round, each buyer learns how
much the good is worth to him, i.e. he learns his own valuation. These val-
uations are different for each buyer and measured in points. The valuations
will be randomly assigned to the buyers in each round and can be 30, 40,
50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100 or 110 points. Among the buyers, each number is
assigned only once within a round, i.e. one buyer is assigned a valuation of
30 points, another buyer is assigned a valuation of 40 points, yet another
buyer is assigned a valuation of 50 points and so on.
What can a buyer earn?
A buyer can earn points by trading, i.e. by buying the good from a seller.
If a trade occurs, a buyer gets the valuation (measured in points) minus the
price (measured in points):
Buyer’s earnings in points = valuation - price
If no trade occurs, a buyer earns 0 points.
How does trading work for the buyer?
Trading is done on an online market platform. A buyer can trade in two
possible ways :
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1. He can accept an ask that has been submitted by a seller. The trade
then occurs at the price of the ask.
2. Alternatively, he can submit a bid, i.e. the price at which he is willing
to buy. If a seller accepts this bid or submits a lower ask, the trade
occurs at the price of this bid.
The two possible ways of trading will be explained in more detail later on
the screen.
The following screenshot shows what the online market platform looks like:
Figure 5: Double Auction Screen Buyer
In each trading round, buyers are numbered consecutively from 1 to 9. The
numbers change each round such that no buyer can be identified. In the
example, the buyer has number 2. The valuation of the buyer in this round
is 50, as you learn from the message on the screen “Your valuation is 50.”
You see a list of all market participants at the right side of the screen. Bids
and asks of the buyers and sellers are displayed in the table “Current bids
and asks”.
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At the beginning of each round, there is a countdown of 10 seconds during
which each buyer learns his valuation. Then the market opens for 60 seconds.
While the market is open, each buyer can trade one unit of the good by
accepting an ask of a seller or by submitting a bid (these are the two possible
ways of trading shortly described before):
1. Each buyer can accept an ask from the table “Current bids and
asks”. He does so by clicking on the accept button that shows up next
to the lowest ask in the table. The good then trades for the price of
the ask.
2. Alternatively, each buyer can submit a bid, i.e. a price at which
he is willing to buy the good. In order to do so, he can enter a value
and click on Submit. The bid then appears in the table “Current bids
and asks” and is visible to all sellers and buyers. Within a trading
round, a buyer can revise his bid as many times as he likes and replace
it by a new one. If a seller accepts the bid of the buyer, trade occurs
at the price of the bid. To avoid a loss, a buyer can only submit bids
that are equal to or lower than his valuation.
If a buyer submits a bid and there are lower asks in the table, trade
occurs at the price of the lowest ask. In principle, it is the same as if
the buyer had directly accepted the lowest (and thus currently best)
ask in the table.
When the market closes, each buyer receives feedback about his payoff and
all trades from that round.
What can a seller do?
In each trading round, each seller can produce one unit of a fictional good
that he can sell in the market. At the beginning of each trading round, each
seller learns how much it costs for him to produce this good, i.e. he learns his
own production costs. These production costs are measured in points. They
will be randomly assigned to the sellers in each round and can be 10, 20, 30,
40, 50, 60, 70, 80 or 90 points. Among the sellers, each number is assigned
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only once within a round, i.e. one seller is assigned production costs of 10
points, another seller is assigned production costs of 20 points, yet another
seller is assigned production costs of 30 points and so on.
What can a seller earn?
A seller can earn points by trading, i.e. by selling the good to a buyer. If a
trade occurs, a seller gets the price (measured in points) minus the production
costs (measured in points):
Seller’s earnings in points = price - production costs
If no trade occurs, the good is not produced, i.e. the seller does not pay the
production costs. Thus, if no trade occurs, a seller earns 0 points.
How does trading work for the seller?
Trading is done on an online market platform. A seller can trade in two
possible ways :
1. He can accept a bid that has been submitted by a buyer. The trade
then occurs at the price of this bid.
2. Alternatively, he can submit an ask, i.e. the price at which he is willing
to sell. If a buyer accepts this ask or submits a higher bid, the trade
occurs at the price of this ask.
The two possible ways of trading will be explained in more detail later on
the screen.
The following screenshot shows what the online market platform looks like.
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Figure 6: Double Auction Screen Seller
In each trading round, sellers are numbered consecutively from 1 to 9. The
numbers change each round such that no seller can be identified. In the
example, the seller has number 5. The production costs of the seller in this
round are 20, as you can see from the message on the screen “Your produc-
tion costs are 20.” You see a list of all market participants at the right side
of the screen. Bids and asks of the buyers and sellers are displayed in the
table “Current bids and asks”.
At the beginning of each round, there is a countdown of 10 seconds during
which each seller learns his production costs. Then the market opens for 60
seconds. While the market is open, each seller can trade one unit of the good
by accepting a bid of a buyer or by submitting an ask:
1. Each seller can accept a bid from the table “Current bids and asks”.
He does so by clicking on the accept button that shows up next to the
highest bid in the table. The good trades at the price of the bid.
2. Alternatively, each seller can submit an ask, i.e. a price at which he
is willing to sell the good. In order to do so, he can enter a value and
click on Submit. The ask then appears in the table “Current bids and
asks” and is visible to all sellers and buyers. Within a trading round,
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a seller can revise his ask as many times as he likes and replace it by
a new one. If a buyer accepts the ask of the seller, trade occurs at the
price of the ask. To avoid a loss, a seller can only submit asks that are
equal to or above his production costs.
If a seller submits an ask and there are higher bids in the table, trade
occurs at the price of the highest bid. In principle, it is the same as if
the seller had directly accepted the highest bid in the table.
When the market closes, each seller receives feedback about his payoff and
all trades from that round.
Control questions
Please answer the following questions:
1. You are a buyer. Your valuation for the good is 50 points. You submit
a bid of 40 points and a seller accepts this bid. What are your earnings
(in points)?
2. You are a seller. Your production costs for the good are 20 points. You
submit an ask of 25 points and a buyer accepts this ask. What are your
earnings (in points)?
3. You are a buyer. Your valuation for the good is 40 points. Is it possible
to submit a bid of 60 points? Yes/No
What comes next
• If you click on the next button, you will enter a waiting screen. Please
be patient and wait until everyone finished reading the instructions
and answering the questions. You will have to wait for 10 minutes at
maximum.
• Afterwards, you will learn your role: Seller or buyer.
• There will be two test trading rounds to make you familiar with the
screen and the rules. The earnings from the test rounds do not count
for payment.
38
• After the two test rounds, there will be 10 trading rounds.
• Remember: One out of the 10 trading rounds will be randomly chosen
at the end of part 3 to count for payment. The chosen round determines
the money that will be added to your participation reward of $3.00.
One point equals $0.20. You will learn which round was chosen and
the money you earned after finishing part 3.
• Due to technical problems or other reasons it can happen that partic-
ipants drop out of the study. To carry on with the game, automated
players will take the open spots. Such a “bot” will always offer the good
at a price equal to his production costs as a seller and bid a price equal
to his valuation as a buyer. Bots will be indicated as such. (Therefore,
all other players are real human players.)
9.2 Instructions Lottery
Welcome and thank you for your participation!
This is a study on decision-making. Please read the following instructions
carefully.
The study consists of 3 parts:
• Part 1: A task + a game
• Part 2: A decision scenario
• Part 3: A short questionnaire
We will explain each part of the study before the respective part will start.
You will receive a fixed participation reward of $3.00 at the end of part 3.
In part 1, you can additionally earn points which will be converted to real
money.
One point equals $0.20.
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The money you will earn in part 1 will be added to the fixed participation
reward of $3.00. In parts 2 and 3, no additional money can be earned. You
have to finish all 3 parts of the study to receive payment. You will receive
your personal code that allows you to receive your payment through MTurk
at the end of the study.
General rules
This part consists of two sections. First, we will ask you to spend 10 minutes
on a transcription task. Second, you will play a lottery game in which
you can earn points. For the lottery, you will be randomly assigned to a
group of 9 participants. The other participants are real people (MTurkers).
Within this group, each participant plays 10 rounds of the lottery game,
which we will explain to you later. One of these rounds will be randomly
chosen at the end of the study to count for your payment.
How does the transcription task work?
You will see some text passages and we ask you to transcribe (copy) these
passages into an input field. Try to be exact and make sure to get all charac-
ters and spaces correctly. Note that copy-paste is not possible. Your earnings
do not depend on your performance. However, we ask you to transcribe as
many words as possible within the 10 minutes. After the transcription task,
you are assigned to a group of 9 participants and the lottery will start.
How does the lottery work?
At the beginning of each round, each participant has to choose a number
that can be 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 or 100 and enter this number in an
input field on the screen.
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Figure 7: Lottery Screen
Then, the computer randomly assigns a number that can be 20, 30, 40, 50, 60,
70, 80, 90 or 100 to each participant. Among the 9 participants of a group,
each number is assigned only once within a period, i.e. one participant is
assigned number 20, another participant is assigned number 30, yet another
participant is assigned number 40 and so on.
Figure 8: Lottery Group
What can a participant earn?
Case 1: Number chosen = number assigned by computer
If the number a participant chooses coincides with the number that was ran-
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domly assigned to him, this participant earns 50 points.
Case 2: Number chosen 6= number assigned by computer
If the number a participant chooses does not coincide with the number that
was randomly assigned to him, this participant earns:
• 0 points with probability 50%
• 10 points with probability 12.5%
• 20 points with probability 12.5%
• 30 points with probability 12.5% or
• 40 points with probability 12.5%.
Note: The earnings of one participant are independent of all other partici-
pants’ earnings.
Example 1
If a participant chooses number 20 and is then assigned number 80, he re-
ceives:
• 0 points with probability 50%
• 10 points with probability 12.5%
• 20 points with probability 12.5%
• 30 points with probability 12.5% or
• 40 points with probability 12.5%.
Example 2
If a participant chooses number 70 and is then assigned number 70, he re-
ceives 50 points.
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Control questions
Please answer the following questions to make sure you understood the rules
of the game correctly.
1. You choose number 60. The computer randomly assigns number 40 to
you. Your earnings are then 50 points. Yes/No
2. You choose number 20. The computer randomly assigns number 20 to
you. What are your earnings (in points)?
3. If you are assigned number 80, can another participant be assigned
number 80? Yes/No
What comes next
• If you click on the next button, you will directly continue with the
transcription task.
• Once you finished the transcription task, you will proceed with the lot-
tery: There will be two test rounds of the lottery to make you familiar
with the screen and the rules. The earnings from the test rounds do
not count for payment.
• After the test rounds, there will be 10 rounds of the lottery.
• Remember: One out of the 10 rounds will be randomly chosen at the
end of part 3 to count for payment. The chosen round determines the
money that will be added to your participation reward of $3.00. One
point equals $0.20. You will learn which round was chosen and the
money you earned after finishing part 3.
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9.3 Questionnaire
1. Moral Dilemma Questions
(a) Please, explain based on what you made your decision in the box-
car situation. Text field
(b) Please remember the boxcar situation: How many persons would
be killed if you stayed passive? Text field, only numbers possible.
(c) Please remember the boxcar situation: How many persons would
be killed if you actively intervened? Text field, only numbers pos-
sible.
(d) I seriously thought about my decision. 7-point scale from strongly
disagree to strongly agree
(e) I am satisfied with my decision. 7-point scale from strongly dis-
agree to strongly agree
(f) Which of the actions is the morally right one? Stay passive, ac-
tively intervene, neither, both (in random order)
(g) In your opinion, how did you perform in the game before? Very
poorly, poorly, fairly, well, very well
(h) How was your mood during the study? 5-point scale from very
bad to very good
2. Experiences in/with markets
(a) Do you negotiate prices of products you want to buy? Never,
rarely, sometimes, often, always
(b) Do you use online shopping platforms like e.g. Ebay (as buyer or
seller)? Never, rarely, sometimes, often, always
(c) Do you trade in the stock exchange market? Never, rarely, some-
times, often, always
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3. Fair Market Ideology (FMI) Scale
Please evaluate the following statements on the 11-point scale ranging
from -5 (“Completely disagree”) to +5 (“Completely agree”):
(a) The free market system is a fair system.
(b) Common or “normal” business practices must be fair, or they
would not survive.
(c) In many markets, there is no such thing as a true “fair” market
price.
(d) Ethical businesses are not as profitable as unethical businesses.
(e) The most fair economic system is a market system in which ev-
eryone is allowed to independently pursue their own economic in-
terests.
(f) Acting in response to market forces is not always a fair way to
conduct business.
(g) The free market system is an efficient system.
(h) The free market system has nothing to do with fairness.
(i) Acting in response to market forces is an ethical way to conduct
business.
(j) In free market systems, people tend to get the outcomes that they
deserve.
(k) The fairest outcomes result from transactions in which the buyers
pay the “fair” market price.
(l) Profitable businesses tend to be more morally responsible than
unprofitable businesses.
(m) Regulated trade is fair trade.
(n) Economic markets do not fairly reward people.
(o) Whatever price a buyer and seller agree to trade at is a fair price.
Please evaluate the following statements on the 11-point scale ranging
from -5 (“Completely unfair”) to +5 (“Completely fair”):
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(a) When a company raises the prices that it charges its customers
for its goods, because management has obtained market research
which suggests that its customers are willing to pay more, it is. . .
(b) When a professional athlete receives a raise because a raise has
been received by another league player of comparable ability, but
none the other team members receive comparable raises, it is. . .
(c) The fact that scarce goods tend to cost more in a free market
system is. . .
(d) When a company downsizes in order to reduce its costs to be more
competitive with rival companies, it is. . .
(e) When concessions at airports and concerts charge higher prices
for beverages because they know that their customers have no
alternatives, it is. . .
(f) The fact that wealthier people live in bigger homes and better
neighborhoods than poorer people who cannot afford to pay the
same prices is. . .
(g) When a company lays off higher-cost employees in the U.S. and
replaces them with lower wage workers in a foreign country in
order to make higher profits, it is. . .
(h) The fact that housing prices in Palo Alto, California are four to
six times those for comparable houses in Chicago is. . .
(i) The fact that more educated employees tend to earn higher wages
than less-educated employees is. . .
(j) The fact that some working families can afford to hire more house-
hold help than others is. . .
4. Risk Aversion
How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully pre-
pared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a
box on the scale, where the value 0 means: “not at all willing to take
risks” and the value 10 means: “very willing to take risks”.
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5. Trust
Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? Please tick a
box on the scale, where the value 0 means: “You can’t be too careful”
and the value 10 means: “Most people can be trusted”.
6. Sociodemographic variables
(a) Please tell us with which gender you identify yourself. Male, Fe-
male, Other (with text field)
(b) Please tell us your age. Text field, only numbers
(c) What is your native language? English, Other (with text field)
(d) What is your nationality? US American, Other (with text field)
(e) Would you please give your best guess on your annual income of
the previous year? Please indicate the answer that includes your
entire household income before taxes. 12 Categories in steps of
10,000: Less than $10,000; $10,000 to $19,999;...; $100,000 to
$149,999; $150,000 or more
(f) What is your highest level of education you completed? Less than
High School, High School/GED, Some College (no degree), Bache-
lor’s Degree, Master’s Degree, Advanced Graduate work or Ph.D.,
Other (with text field)
(g) What is current employment status? Employed for wages, Self-
employed, out of work and looking for work, out of work but not
currently looking for work, a homemaker, a student, military, re-
tired, unable to work, Other (with text field)
(h) What religion do you associate yourself with? Christian, Jew-
ish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Atheist, Other (please specify) Text
field
(i) How often do you attend religious services? (Answers may be
approximate.) Never, Once a year, Once a month, Once a week,
Multiple times a week
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(j) Are you familiar with any version of the so-called “Moral Trolley
Problem” or “Trolley Problem”? Yes, No
(k) If you wish you can leave us a comment. Text field
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